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FOREWORD: FAIR USE IN THE DIGITAL AGE, AND 
CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE AT 21 
Zahr K. Said* 
Most students who study intellectual property in law school read 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,1 and I would guess that those who 
read it probably remember it, even years after the fact. It features not just 
pop culture, but an outré attention-seeking band with a lack of nuance, 
the Kardashians of the 1990s hip-hop scene. The case revolved around 
“Pretty Woman,” a not-very-good, probably unfamiliar-to-students rap 
parody of Roy Orbison’s well-loved and almost certainly familiar-to-
students song, “Oh, Pretty Woman.”2 The larger-than-life rap group, 2 
Live Crew, had faced legal battles of various sorts for years, and had 
earned great notoriety in connection with public debates over obscenity.3 
Many cities in America found 2 Live Crew “unacceptable,” if not illegal, 
and actual charges of obscenity were raised in Florida and Louisiana for 
sales to minors and also for sales outright.4 In 1990, a Florida court had 
made legal history by being the first federal court to find a piece of 
music obscene when it ruled on 2 Live Crew’s album, As Nasty as They 
Wanna Be.5 In so doing, it led the way for prosecutors to go after record 
stores distributing the album as well as to arrest the group itself for 
performing “obscene” music.6 These well-publicized legal skirmishes 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. The Author thanks Judge 
Leval, Lisa Manheim, M.J. Durkee, Brad Haque, Sean O’Connor, and Mallory Gitt for their 
comments on this topic and their assistance with the Foreword and its accompanying symposium. 
1. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
2. See generally id.  
3. See, e.g., Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 596 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (finding 
2 Live Crew’s album, As Nasty As They Wanna Be, obscene under the Miller test); Tom Wicker, In 
the Nation: Lyrics and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at A23. 
4. William E. Brigman, Pornography, Obscenity and the Humanities: Mapplethrope, 2 Live Crew 
and the Elitist Definition of Art, in RAY B. BROWNE AND MARSHALL W. FISHWICK, REJUVENATING 
THE HUMANITIES 55, 57 (1992). 
5. David Browne, The State of Obscenity in Rap, ENT. WKLY. (Jan. 17, 2015, 6:16 AM), 
http://www.ew.com/article/1990/06/29/state-obscenity-rap.  
6. Judge in Louisiana Bars Sale of 2 Live Crew Album, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 16, 1990), 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1990-12-16/news/9012160361_1_harvest-records-james-morris-
579 
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made the members of 2 Live Crew well-known figures, to say nothing of 
vividly memorable defendants. If law students were inclined to forget 
the case, subsequent courts cite to Campbell so dutifully that forgetting it 
seems impossible.7 Of course, with the litigants’ hit singles including the 
embarrassingly successful song,8 “Me So Horny,” and others with titles 
and lyrics so lewd I would prefer not to cite them in a law review article, 
such a lapse in student memory seems unlikely.9 While it seems 
remarkable to many, Campbell is now, anthropomorphically speaking, 
not only old enough to buy the 2 Live Crew albums once deemed 
obscene,10 but also old enough to consume a beer legally while listening 
to them. 
If Campbell had remained a narrow pop-culture case—a doctrinal 
one-hit wonder—it would not have possessed the capacity to generate so 
much enthusiasm, and such heated debate, among scholars and 
practitioners of high caliber. Yet gathered at the University of 
Washington School of Law for two days in April 2015 were forty of the 
leading and emerging experts in copyright law in the United States, to 
discuss the impact the case has had and to speculate about the directions 
fair use law will take in light of this watershed opinion. It remains, by 
many accounts, one of the three most important fair use opinions in 
American law.11 Reflecting on Campbell’s wide and deep footprint in 
the case law over the twenty-one years since the case was handed down 
forms the purpose for our Symposium and for this collection of excellent 
scholarly papers in the Washington Law Review. 
To assess how and why the case has seemed to have so great an 
impact on copyright case law, the Washington Law Review has turned to 
crew-album. 2 Live Crew was brought up on misdemeanor obscenity charges but later acquitted. 
Sara Rimer, Rap Band Members Found Not Guilty in Obscenity Trial, NY TIMES, Oct. 21, 1990, at 
A1.  
7. A Westlaw search as of May 10, 2015, reveals that 495 cases have cited to Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose, and three of those citations are in international courts. Roughly a fifth of the total citations 
(105) occurred in the past three years, demonstrating not only that Campbell remains important case 
law, but potentially suggesting that contemporary courts find it even more important now, eighteen 
to twenty-one years after its original decision, than it was then. 
8. The group’s album sold over two million copies in days, and catapulted twenty-nine spots up 
the Billboard chart in the days after the obscenity ruling in Florida in 1990. Browne, supra note 5. 
9. Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the 
Desire to Sanitize Society – From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 
830 (1992) (discussing some of the group’s extremely vulgar lyrics).  
10. Wicker, supra note 3 (describing, in 1990, the charges against an Alabama salesman who was 
the first person in this country to be “found guilty of selling recorded obscenity”). 
11. Stephen McJohn, The Case of the Missing Case: Stewart v. Abend and Fair Use, 53 IDEA 
323, 324 (2013). 
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eight authors to explore various issues associated with the opinion, from 
its arguments’ internal justifications and origins to its effect on lower 
courts’ decision-making. In this Foreword, I will offer a few thoughts to 
explain Campbell’s importance and to situate it historically, and I will 
touch briefly on the far-ranging contributions made by the very 
accomplished Articles in this Symposium issue. 
When the Supreme Court decided Campbell v. Acuff-Rose in 1994, it 
seemed perhaps straightforward enough: parody, however tasteless or 
offensive, had gotten a pass; other uses appeared to be—perhaps—less 
clearly favored.12 Yet the Court’s reasoning in Campbell also seemed as 
though it could be read to clear the way for a range of unauthorized 
cultural appropriation practices beyond parody, at least those practices 
whose purpose in using the underlying work was “transformative.”13 
Less clear was what sorts of practices would count as transformative.14 
The Court had relied on Judge Pierre N. Leval’s seminal Harvard 
Law Review article, Toward a Fair Use Standard,15 to articulate a 
framework for assessing the reason for a defendant’s use of plaintiff’s 
work.16 Judge Leval had been a judge for the Southern District of New 
York, and he had happened to receive a considerable number of 
copyright cases on his docket, thus developing particular expertise and 
insight into this area of law.17 With twenty-one years of hindsight, it is 
beyond cavil that Judge Leval’s article has—to transplant the word 
transformative—transformed the fair use landscape. Whether one 
believes it is the only factor that seems to matter, or perhaps the only 
factor that should truly matter, the transformative use question has 
almost certainly become the central analysis in most contemporary fair 
use cases.18 Boiled down, Judge Leval’s argument was that factor one, 
12. Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 869, 872 (2015) (describing 
the contemporary reception of Campbell). 
13. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569, 579 (1994). 
14. Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815, 825–26 (2015). 
15. In 1977, after a distinguished record of practice in both the private and public sectors, Judge 
Leval was appointed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. He was then 
appointed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1993, and assumed Senior Judge status in 2002. 
See Pierre N. Leval, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/ 
judges/bios/pnl.html (last visited May 5, 2015). 
16. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
17. Id. at 1105, 1112–15 (describing, in particular, his experience in Salinger v. Random House, 
Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev’d, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
890 (1987), and New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), 
aff’d on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
18. Compare Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC, a rare example of a case in which a judge takes 
issue with the dominance of transformative use analysis, and resolves the case under factor three 
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which looks at the purpose and character of defendant’s unauthorized 
use of the work, could determine whether a use was justified, in terms of 
copyright’s larger purposes.19 He has referred to the factor one analysis 
as “the soul of fair use.”20 Other commentators have concurred, noting 
that courts rarely look to the second and third factors as determinants,21 
though at least one scholar has proposed acknowledging that emphasis 
on factor one by explicitly adopting a two-factor test.22 
Campbell contained a number of doctrinal developments, some minor 
and some more major.23 It also reversed the momentum created by two 
key presumptions in prior case law, namely that commercial uses were 
presumptively unfair, and that plaintiffs were allowed to presume harm 
when defendants’ uses were commercial.24 In clarifying that 
transformative use could weigh heavily in favor of fair use, even when 
uses were commercial,25 the court may have put a great deal of pressure 
on whether a use was transformative. Indeed, some feared that the term 
might be so malleable as to be unhelpful.26 The term was considered 
capable of endless manipulation.27 While there remains debate over 
whether the transformative use analysis actually plays as important a 
role as many have asserted, by and large, transformative use remains a 
crucial aspect of fair use litigation.28 
(the amount of the borrowing) rather than factor one (the purpose and character of the use). 766 
F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014).  
19. Leval, supra note 16, at 1111. 
20. Id. at 1116. 
21. See, e.g., June Besek’s testimony before Congress, in which she stated that “a finding that a 
use is ‘transformative’ now tends to sweep all before it, reducing the statutory multifactor 
assessment to a single inquiry.” The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 17 (2014) 
(statement of June M. Besek, Executive Director, Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts 
and Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia Law School); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of 
Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 743 (2011).  
22. Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 572 (2008). 
23. Samuelson, supra note 14, at 818. 
24. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583–84, 594 (1994). 
25. Id. at 579. 
26. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change, the Less They Seem “Transformed”: 
Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251, 252 (1998). 
27. Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 447–48 (2008) (“The malleable nature of the term has not escaped the 
notice of commentators; Diane Zimmerman has called it ‘a nice try at avoiding the fair use mess, 
but no cigar.’” (quoting Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 268)).  
28. In Making Sense of Fair Use, Neil Netanel has argued that transformative use analysis has 
decisively shaped the doctrine, whether or not courts use the phrase “transformative use.” Netanel, 
supra note 21. But cf. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
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The inquiry into whether a work is transformative does not take place 
in a doctrinal vacuum, and should not be tackled in isolation. Many 
scholars have explored the cultural meanings of fair use, and Michael 
Madison has suggested that fair use is less a doctrine to be applied 
rigidly and more “an analytic tool that focuses on social and cultural 
patterns.”29 The emphasis on transformation contains historical 
aspects—because of the explosion of digital technologies that make 
transformation quick, easy, and ubiquitous—and it contains cultural 
dimensions, because of changes in music, art, and other cultural 
developments.30 Indeed, Campbell takes on special importance in light 
of what Aram Sinnreich has dubbed “configurable culture,” a set of 
beliefs and practices that point to a “larger cultural shift” in our 
relationship to media and the arts.31 This cultural shift reflects the 
coevolution of technology and culture in a way that, per Sinnreich, has 
redefined the relationship between media production and consumption.32 
Campbell, if understood in light of copyright law alone, makes less 
sense than it does when considered in a broader, more historically 
attuned context. 
Without making a claim that Campbell changed the world—a claim 
that might actually be defensible, but which I do not take pains to defend 
here—it is no exaggeration to say that since Campbell was decided, the 
world has fundamentally changed, in ways that may well matter for 
copyright law. Historically, Campbell feels more august than its age of 
twenty-one years old. To put Campbell in historical context, when it was 
decided, the North American Free Trade Agreement was only three 
months old. The murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman 
would take place a few months after Campbell, in June 1994. And later 
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 588 (2008) (arguing that empirical analysis reflects concerted 
focus on factor one for a time, but positing that a return to judicial discussion of market harm has 
taken place). Netanel revisits Beebe’s excellent empirical work, but draws different conclusions. 
Netanel, supra note 21, at 720–25. 
29. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1525, 1645 (2004). 
30. Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1460, 
1499–1508 (2008) (situating the rise of a new form of creative expression, user-generated content, 
in a broader context of technological evolution, and exploring the legal dimensions of these often 
unauthorized transformations of works authored or owned by others).  
31. ARAM SINNREICH, MASHED UP: MUSIC, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF CONFIGURABLE 
CULTURE, at xv (2010). 
32. Id. While Sinnreich’s analysis focuses on music, copyright case law makes clear that the 
configurations Sinnreich describes in his book take place—and are litigated—in copyright law 
beyond music, as well. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2002); Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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still would come: the cloning of Dolly the sheep (1995); the introduction 
of the Euro (1999); and, for lack of a more nuanced way to put it, the 
internet as we now know it, with webmail and Google search (roughly 
1995–1998).33 The seeds of the digital revolution had been planted, but 
had not yet borne fruit, at least not in any way that the mass population 
experienced in their daily lives.34 iTunes, a consumer staple in 2015, had 
not yet come close to being created.35 In 1994, the “worldwide web” was 
(depending on whose account and definition one selects) about three 
years old, and although Mosaic, a user-friendly browser, had just been 
created, to be followed the next year by Netscape Navigator, few in the 
general population had internet access, let alone email accounts and 
other digital technologies.36 It would not be until 1995 that the “world 
wide web” became commercialized for the general public.37 There was a 
futuristic, breathless quality to accounts of what the internet might one 
day do, as this hybrid piece of journalism-slash-science-fiction reveals: 
Today, even privately owned desktop computers can become 
Internet nodes. You can carry one under your arm. Soon, 
perhaps, on your wrist. 
 But what does one do with the Internet? Four things, 
basically: mail, discussion groups, long-distance computing, and 
file transfers. 
 Internet mail is “e-mail,” electronic mail, faster by several 
orders of magnitude than the US Mail, which is scornfully 
known by Internet regulars as “snailmail.” Internet mail is 
somewhat like fax. It’s electronic text. But you don’t have to 
pay for it (at least not directly), and it’s global in scope. E-mail 
can also send software and certain forms of compressed digital 
imagery. New forms of mail are in the works. 
. . . . 
 How does one get access to the Internet? Well — if you don’t 
have a computer and a modem, get one. Your computer can act 
as a terminal, and you can use an ordinary telephone line to 
33. See, e.g., Cameron Chapman, The History of the Internet in a Nutshell, SIX REVISIONS (Nov. 
15, 2009), http://sixrevisions.com/resources/the-history-of-the-internet-in-a-nutshell/; Barry M. 
Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y, http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/ 
what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet (last visited May 5, 2015). 
34. Leiner et al., supra note 33. 
35. Apple Fast Facts, CNN.COM (Jan. 29, 2015, 2:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/01/ 
business/apple-fast-facts/ (noting iTunes, Apple’s digital music service, did not appear until 2001).  
36. Mosaic was the name of that browser. Chapman, supra note 33; Leiner et al., supra note 33. 
37. Chapman, supra note 33.  
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connect to an Internet-linked machine. These slower and simpler 
adjuncts to the Internet can provide you with the netnews 
discussion groups and your own e-mail address. These are 
services worth having — though if you only have mail and 
news, you’re not actually “on the Internet” proper.38 
These historic touchpoints could theoretically be distinctions without 
meaningful difference, but, in fact, it is difficult to overstate the import 
of the technological and cultural changes that have occurred in the 
twenty-one years since Campbell. The macro historical and cultural 
changes have surely contributed to judicial willingness to find in 
Campbell the infrastructure for doctrinal change and growth. Digital 
technologies and concomitant changes in consumer behavior have led to 
numerous—perhaps unforeseeable but insistent—pressures on copyright 
doctrine. Copyright owners have had to decide as a part of their broader 
business strategies whether to embrace creative consumer uses of their 
intellectual property, or resist them and fight an uphill battle.39 
Of course, fair use may well be the way courts in copyright cases 
respond when doctrines bear the weight of enormous change in the 
practices of copyright owners, competitors, and end-users. The difficulty 
in determining whether fair use applies to new uses and technologies 
may be a feature of the 1976 Copyright Act,40 one that has arisen often 
since the landmark case of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.,41 and that seems destined to recur.42 Sony held that video-
recording devices used to make copies of copyrighted works by 
consumers for “time shifting,” or watching television at a later time, was 
a fair use.43 It was significant in part because it created a safe harbor for 
distributors of devices capable of copyright infringement, so long as they 
were capable of “substantial noninfringing uses” as well, and the 
purposes of these uses were of a particular kind (non-commercial, for 
38. Bruce Sterling, Science: Internet, 84 MAG. OF FANTASY & SCI. FICTION 99, 104, 106 (1993) 
(emphasis in original). 
39. Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615, 634–35 
(2015) (discussing Disney’s change of strategy with respect to unauthorized uses by fans). 
40. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). 
41. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
42. Jessica Litman, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 651, 673 (2015) (“As the 1976 
Act aged, . . . [c]ourts have struggled to figure out how fair use applies to new uses and new 
technologies.”). It is thus fitting to note that as Campbell comes of age at twenty-one, Sony too 
deserves a retrospective look. See generally Fromer, supra note 39, at 623–24; Litman, supra note 
42. 
43. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 455. 
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one thing).44 The Court went so far as to state a presumption that a use 
was unfair if it was commercial, and further that a plaintiff could 
presume market harm when defendant’s uses were commercial.45 
In addition to the broader historical context, the Campbell decision 
arose at a particular cultural moment worth recalling. 2 Live Crew had 
encountered legal challenges before, standing trial on obscenity charges 
as discussed above.46 The group’s vulgar lyrics and defiant stance won 
many fans, and its first album was certified gold.47 The group’s aim 
appeared to be to generate controversy, while thumbing its nose at social 
and artistic convention. Few other hip-hop or rap artists were as 
consistently associated with controversy or as instrumental in generating 
moral condemnation.48 In America at the time, there was a general view 
that the arts were “under attack,” and certain artists, in particular, 
seemed like lightning rods for the battles over moral values that were 
being waged along political and class lines.49 For example, the 
photographers Robert Mapplethorpe and Andes Serrano, along with 2 
Live Crew, came under heavy fire.50 The pop star Madonna, dubbed the 
“queen of obscene,” was another source of constant moral critique.51 In 
1992 alone, she released both an album called “Erotica,” containing 
explicit lyrics and accompanied by racy music videos, and a coffee table 
book called “Sex,” filled with nude photos that could be considered 
pornographic.52 In March of 1994, the same month in which Campbell 
was decided, Madonna famously scandalized television audiences by 
saying the “f-word” on network TV fourteen times, and handing the late-
44. Id. at 456.  
45. Id. at 451. 
46. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
47. 2 Live Crew Is What We Are, THE 2 LIVE CREW, http://2livecrew.info/2-live-crew-is-what-
we-are (last visited May 17, 2015). 
48. Steve Huey, Biography, ALLMUSIC.COM, http://www.allmusic.com/artist/2-live-crew-
mn0000027116/biography (last visited May 5, 2015) (“No rap group (save, perhaps, N.W.A) has 
stirred more controversy or provoked more heated debate than the 2 Live Crew. The furor over the 
graphic sexual content of their X-rated party rhymes—specifically their 1989 album As Nasty as 
They Wanna Be—was a major catalyst in making rap music a flash point for controversy and an 
easily visible target for self-appointed moral guardians.”). 
49. Brigman, supra note 4, at 55. 
50. Blanchard, supra note 9, at 742–43 (characterizing critiques of these and other artists as 
“campaigns” and “crusades” against them); Brigman, supra note 4, at 55–65. 
51. KIRK D. DAVIDSON, SELLING SIN: THE MARKETING OF SOCIALLY UNACCEPTABLE PRODUCTS 
100 (2003). 
52. Robbie Daw, Madonna’s ‘Sex’ Book Still the Most Sought-After Out-of-Print Title, 
IDOLATOR.COM (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.idolator.com/5995622/madonna-sex-book-most-sought-
after-title.  
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night talk show host David Letterman a pair of her underpants and 
instructing him several times to smell them.53 Other artists like Ice-T and 
Snoop Doggie Dogg were also singled out for political invective by 
conservative America for their rebellious, violent, graphic, or explicit 
works of art.54 2 Live Crew’s notoriety should thus be considered 
against the backdrop of larger social movements for and against freedom 
of expression, and evaluated with an eye to their place in the greater 
countercultural revolt. 
The war on 2 Live Crew was partisan; conservatives went after the 
group while liberals tended to shrug and decouple moral judgment from 
the assessment of whether the group was worth its while.55 There was 
something indisputably low-brow or mass-market about 2 Live Crew, 
something that seemed to differentiate it from the erotic art that could be 
defended if it were aimed at a mass market.56 There was, of course, 
something racially very different: 2 Live Crew, and rap in general, 
aimed at a young black market.57 Whereas, to borrow Professor Henry 
Louis Gates Jr.’s point, there was little legal clamor over the comedian 
Andrew Dice Clay’s vulgar routines, the vulgarity of 2 Live Crew was 
deemed worse and more threatening because of its insubordination, its 
racial defiance.58 Professor Gates situated 2 Live Crew’s work in a 
historic tradition of African-American artistic expression known as 
“signifying,” which he had described in his critically acclaimed book, 
The Signifyin’ Monkey.59 The pattern of speaking back to power was one 
that had a long history in slave rebellion and cultural subversion.60 The 
53. Alex Heigil, The Most Censored Interview Ever: Madonna’s 1994 Letterman Appearance 
Turns 20, PEOPLE (Mar. 31, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.people.com/people/article/ 
0,,20801703,00.html. 
54. DAVIDSON, supra note 51, at 100. 
55. ANDREW HARTMAN, A WAR FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE CULTURE 
WARS 171–72 (2015). 
56. Id. at 57–58. 
57. Blanchard, supra note 9, at 828–29. 
58. Henry Louis Gates Jr., 2 Live Crew, Decoded, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1990, at A23 (“2 Live 
Crew is engaged in heavy-handed parody, turning the stereotypes of black and white American 
culture on their heads.”).  
59. Id. 
60. Zahr Said Stauffer, ‘Po-Mo Karaoke’ or Postcolonial Pastiche? What Fair Use Could Draw 
from Literary Criticism, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 43, 67 (2007) (describing the need to create room 
for fair uses in the context of postcolonial rewritings precisely because of artistic traditions by 
subordinated groups to “write back” against power: “It is valuable to understand, from a literary 
perspective, how postcolonial rewritings seek to cast history in a new light, in order to reorient an 
historical narrative or dominant cultural myth.”); id. at 79 (citing JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION 
AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS 1–16 (1990)). 
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challenge 2 Live Crew faced was translating its subversive creative 
practices into a form of expression the law would protect, rather than 
ban. This tension played out in 2 Live Crew’s obscenity trial. The 
group’s attorney, Bruce Rogow (who also represented the group in 
Campbell), argued that their music had to be understood in context.61 
Opposing counsel, Assistant State Attorney Pedro Dijols, stated in his 
closing remarks: “I submit to you ladies and gentlemen, if you take an 
orange and put it in a sewer, it doesn’t make it a fruit salad.”62 The 
characterization of art as detritus unworthy of context-sensitive 
consideration sums up the way the debates on art and value tended to 
occur in that era. 
Thus the doctrinal discussion of transformation in copyright law took 
place in the context of highly charged, broader debates about the 
meaning of cultural appropriation and power, and the proper role of law 
in shaping art, more generally. This makes the Court’s language about 
parody all the more powerful: 
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose 
fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for 
sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later 
words can be taken as a comment on the naiveté of the original 
of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the 
ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies. It is 
this joinder of reference and ridicule that marks off the author’s 
choice of parody from the other types of comment and criticism 
that traditionally have had a claim to fair use protection as 
transformative works.63 
The Court’s eyes were, of course, on the doctrinal ball. Yet the 
awareness of “reference and ridicule” as forms of cultural expression 
signal attunement to the aesthetic wars taking place, laden with 
judgments about morality, and structured by hierarchies of privilege.64 
Campbell is a rich opinion indeed, doctrinally, historically, and 
culturally. 
This Symposium gives scholars, practitioners, and judges an 
61. Sara Rimer, Obscenity or Art? Trial on Rap Lyrics Opens, NY TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/17/us/obscenity-or-art-trial-on-rap-lyrics-opens.html (“Bruce 
Rogow, the lead lawyer for the 2 Live Crew, said the group’s performance had to be understood in 
the context of hip hop, a form of black popular music that arose in the last few years. Some of the 
four-letter words, he said, ‘reflect exaggeration, parody, humor, even about delicate subjects,’ like 
sexual practices.”). 
62. Rimer, supra note 6. 
63. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994) (emphasis added). 
64. Id. 
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opportunity to situate Campbell in the past and present, and to make 
guesses about its—about our—copyright future. In proposing that we 
revisit Campbell, we at the University of Washington were excited not 
only by retrospectively assessing how far it had come, but also in casting 
our sights forward, to try to imagine and predict how far it will go. It is 
our hope that this Symposium provides the opportunity to consider the 
many ways in which Campbell remains relevant in spite of the 
technological and cultural changes that have risen in the two decades 
since the decision. This conference also provides us the time and space 
to reflect on the reasons for Campbell’s continued salience and, to 
borrow a phrase from Professor Pamela Samuelson’s title, to imagine its 
“possible futures.” 
To that end, the University of Washington School of Law is 
incredibly honored to host Judge Pierre N. Leval, who has graciously 
agreed to present, and publish here in the Washington Law Review, his 
view of Campbell from the bench in 2015. Judge Leval opens with a 
review of the state of fair use before Campbell, which he characterizes 
as hampered by “a number of unhelpful, distracting, counterproductive 
propositions. . . .”65 When Campbell was decided, it “brought to an end 
fair use’s odyssey of bad piloting and aimless drift.”66 Judge Leval 
summarizes the contributions of Campbell, and lays weight on the 
Court’s rejection of bright-line rules. He describes the “symbiotic” 
nature of the four factors, and argues that they can be reduced to two 
fundamental questions: “1. Does the secondary work copy from the 
original in pursuit of a different objective—a ‘transformative’ purpose? 
2. Does the secondary work compete significantly with the original, by 
offering itself as a significant substitute in markets that the copyright law 
reserves to the original author?”67 He characterizes the two as 
interdependent in Campbell’s formulation. However, subsequent courts 
have not been as sensitive to the factors’ interrelation as might have been 
desired. Judge Leval reviews salient critiques of Campbell and its 
progeny, but he stresses that many of the criticisms of Campbell’s 
progeny reflect courts’ misinterpretations of Campbell rather than 
rejections of the case’s reasoning.68 Nonetheless, he acknowledges that 
Campbell’s transformative use test does leave open a difficult 
determination: When are subsequent works infringing derivative works 
65. Pierre N. Leval, Campbell as Fair Use Blueprint?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 597, 598 (2015). 
66. Id. at 600. 
67. Id. at 602. 
68. Id. at 605. 
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versus being noninfringing fair uses?69 Yet he displays his 
characteristically measured analysis in assessing the term 
“transformative,” and concludes that it is not an inappropriate word, 
stating with appealing humility: “I don’t think I have heard a better 
one.”70 In giving the term meaning, Judge Leval would see the term 
effectuated in terms of the larger purposes of copyright law.71 Finally, 
Judge Leval ends with an entreaty to copyright scholars, but also aimed 
more broadly at the Supreme Court, calling for express disavowal of the 
argument that fair use requires good faith.72 
Professor Pam Samuelson’s Article, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 
does a magisterial job of planting the stakes for the discussion of 
Campbell throughout this volume. She enumerates over a dozen 
contributions the case has made. Samuelson highlights the emphasis on, 
and the “expansive definition” of, transformative use, and ranks those as 
the biggest two contributions.73 But many more follow, including 
Campbell’s repudiation of the dual presumptions found in the Court’s 
prior copyright cases.74 The list of contributions ranges from doctrinal 
issues (how courts should proceed through the four factors) to larger 
issues with business implications (“how courts in fair use cases [should] 
think about licensing”).75 An element she alights upon in passing is the 
Court’s insistence on finding a fair use in spite of the vulgarity of the 
content at issue; the Court properly steered clear of passing aesthetic 
judgment on the work in the course of determining its legal status.76 
Samuelson’s focus is ultimately on the larger legal context and the role 
Campbell played in subsequent legal battles. Samuelson deftly 
summarizes several key cases and categorizes them by type of 
transformativeness: transformation of expression in a preexisting work 
(as with parody); “conventional productive uses” (such as those 
associated with scholarship or biography); and different-purpose 
transformation cases.77 Samuelson reviews Bill Graham Archives v. 
Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,78 Cariou v. Prince,79 and Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
69. Id. at 609–10. 
70. Id. at 608. 
71. Id. at 611. 
72. Id. at 612–14. 
73. Samuelson, supra note 14, at 818.  
74. Id.  
75. Id. at 823. 
76. Id. at 824. 
77. Id. at 826. 
78. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).  
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Corp.80 and its progeny.81 Samuelson focuses particularly on Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust,82 and shows how it both leaned heavily on 
Campbell and extended it.83 Samuelson concludes that Campbell’s 
influence has been both considerable and salutary. She walks through 
the existing critiques of Campbell’s legacy, and then rebuts those 
arguments. In her final section, Samuelson concludes on a creative, 
prescriptive note, offering possible changes to improve fair use. A 
doctrinal tour-de-force, her Article brings an observer up to speed about 
the state of the law, delineates its current problems, and offers some 
ways to address those. 
Professor Jeanne C. Fromer, in Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 
excavates Campbell’s market-oriented reasoning and looks at it closely, 
with fresh eyes. She argues persuasively that Campbell’s reasoning has 
been insufficiently well read, thus failing to exercise the opening it 
created for defendants to argue that their unauthorized uses actually 
create market benefits as well as harms.84 Fromer’s Article is a well-
balanced analysis that seeks to reintroduce benefits, or a “full-bodied” 
approach to analyzing the harm to the plaintiff’s market.85 She argues 
that Campbell can be read to require consideration of all of the market 
effects on a plaintiff’s work, not just the negative ones, and that 
Campbell suggests that while some market effects are relevant, those 
that are not should not enter the analysis.86 Fromer’s careful, even 
exegetical, approach offers a revisionist reading that could improve 
copyright’s fair use analysis and potentially curb baseless claims. She 
offers a vivid example in the story of Disney, a company known for its 
aggression in policing its intellectual property rights. In its huge hit 
animated movie, Frozen, the company faced the dilemma of whether to 
embrace or alienate fans once they began to appropriate aspects of the 
intellectual property from Frozen for creative reuse. Reflecting a 
corporate about-face of sorts, Disney blessed these new, unauthorized 
uses, and seems to have conceded that they are either fair or beneficial in 
79. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
80. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
81. Samuelson, supra note 14, at 833–35. 
82. 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
83. Samuelson, supra note 14, at 836–39 (“The Second Circuit called upon Campbell numerous 
times in the HathiTrust opinion, but took fair use in some new directions in that ruling.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
84. Fromer, supra note 39. 
85. Id. at 629. 
86. Id. at 617. 
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some way for its own franchise’s goodwill.87 
Professor Jessica Litman’s Article, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, begins 
by describing the normative schism in copyright law, and the tension 
between copyright’s critics and champions.88 Litman argues that because 
there has indisputably been an expansion in owners’ rights, it would 
follow that fair use has expanded, and should have done so. In 
characteristically impassioned language, she writes that “[t]he 
idea . . . that copyright owners’ rights could be greatly inflated without 
inspiring a comparable expansion in fair use seems delusive.”89 To put 
flesh on the bones of this expansion, she situates Campbell in the 
broader copyright context by looking at Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc.90 and both what preceded it and what 
followed it.91 Litman thus situates Sony in relationship to the 1909 and 
1976 Copyright Acts, whose opposite treatments of copyright’s proper 
scope created significant uncertainty.92 The facts in Sony represented a 
“surprising example of a situation in which Congress had failed to 
imagine copyright infringement liability and therefore failed to include 
express limitations or define boundaries to divide infringing from non-
infringing actions.”93 Through careful dissection of the Sony opinion, 
including an early draft of it, Litman shows that Justice Stevens believed 
that there ought to be a categorical exemption for consumer home 
copying, but failed to get a majority of Justices to sign off on that full-
throated articulation of personal use’s fairness. The Court’s compromise 
was then enshrined in the Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises94 case, in the form of dual presumptions that would stand 
until Campbell repudiated them.95 Litman pivots to digital technologies 
and similar concerns in the context of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA”), and she manages to draw a line back to the very 
problems that may have engendered some of the reasoning in Campbell: 
the pressure the Copyright Act of 1976 put on fair use.96 While 
Campbell had the welcome effect of correcting some of the excesses (or 
87. Id. at 634–35. 
88. Litman, supra note 42. 
89. Id. at 653. 
90. 464 U.S. 17 (1984). 
91. Litman, supra note 42, at 657–61, 663−71. 
92. Id. at 654–55, 663–65. 
93. Id. at 665. 
94. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
95. Litman, supra note 42, at 672. 
96. Id. at 675–76. 
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errors) in Sony, it left open other important questions pertaining to 
secondary liability and consumer personal uses.97 
Professor Lydia Loren’s piece, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 
explores the implications of treating fair use as an affirmative defense.98 
Prior to Sony, the procedural status of fair use had not been completely 
clear, but in Sony’s wake, as a descriptive matter, the burden clearly lay 
with the defendant on all the factors, including market harm.99 Campbell 
cemented that allocation.100 Loren’s piece explores whether Congress 
intended for fair use to be an affirmative defense—as opposed to a right 
or a privilege a defendant could exercise rather than be forced to 
prove—and she concludes that fair use should not be considered not an 
affirmative defense, but rather should be considered “part of what shapes 
the scope of a copyright owner’s rights.”101 While it may be that, 
empirically, cases have historically not been determined one way or the 
other by this improper burden allocation, Loren is certainly right to 
express concern over the allocation as it stands, because it could matter a 
great deal to outcomes.102 
In The Imaginary Trademark Parody Crisis (and the Real One), 
Professor William McGeveran provides trademark-oriented analysis of 
Campbell, and shows how protecting parody in copyright appears to 
have informed—or evolved alongside—a robust parody jurisprudence in 
trademark law.103 The cases tend, either in reliance on or in correlation 
with Campbell, to be consistent wins for defendants. McGeveran thus 
helpfully tees up the distinction between copyright and trademark 
purposes, and uses the differences in doctrines to highlight Campbell’s 
importance in an occasionally overlapping, substantially related field 
outside copyright law. McGeveran mounts a tenacious defense of a 
thesis he has advanced in prior work: true parody cases are rare in 
contemporary, post-Campbell case law, and when they arise, they tend 
to resolve in favor of defendants.104 As a practical matter, however, the 
97. Id. at 681–82. 
98. Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685 (2015). 
99. Id. at 695–96. 
100. Id. at 692. 
101. Id. at 696.  
102. Id. at 687.  
103. William McGeveran, The Imaginary Trademark Parody Crisis (and the Real One), 90 
WASH. L. REV. 713 (2015). 
104. McGeveran, supra note 103, at 715; see also William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals 
for Trademark Law, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205 (2008); William 
McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008). 
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practice in the marketplace is not usually litigation but chilling effects in 
the form of “unmeritorious demand letters” on the basis of activity that, 
if litigated, would almost certainly be deemed non-infringing.105 In the 
spirit of clear-sighted restatement, McGeveran also productively revisits 
the troublesome parody/satire distinction that subsequent courts seized 
upon in Campbell. Even though the opinion itself contains a much more 
nuanced discussion, subsequent courts have tended to apply the 
distinction without much nuance. In Campbell, parody (which, 
according to the Court’s definition, takes aim at the underlying work to 
make a point about that work) is likely a fair use but satire (which uses 
the work without seeking to make a point about that work) is less likely 
to be a fair use, although it still might be.106 McGeveran’s analysis also 
offers context for just how influential Campbell has been, even beyond 
the doctrinal walls of copyright law. 
In How Much Is Too Much?, Professor R. Anthony Reese provides an 
empirically grounded analysis of the cases since Campbell that have 
applied factor three, which considers the amount and extent of the 
unauthorized borrowing.107 In the course of his analysis, he revisits case 
law in which unauthorized uses were deemed fair even when defendants 
had used the entirety of plaintiffs’ works.108 Reese demonstrates that in 
most of these cases, courts engage in evaluation of “the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s copying in light of her purpose.”109 This insight, in 
turn, can be traced to Campbell, in which Justice Souter introduced 
reasonableness and purpose of the use into the assessment of the amount 
borrowed.110 Reese’s analysis argues that “new digital technologies have 
often enabled new uses of copyrighted works that allow or require using 
the entire work” and litigation often starts but does not typically reach 
full decision in such situations.111 Going forward, Reese argues, 
Campbell’s concrete approach could assist courts by introducing 
reasonable use in light of the purpose.112 
105. Id. at 716. 
106. Id. at 722. Many lower courts have been “clumsy” in taking the distinction as though it were 
a pair of presumptions: Parody? Fair. Satire? Not fair. Yet, as noted throughout this Foreword and 
indeed, throughout this issue, Campbell sought to correct and resist rigid, one-size-fits-all 
presumptions and did not appear to be trying to create or entrench a new one. 
107. R. Anthony Reese, How Much Is Too Much?: Campbell and the Third Fair Use Factor, 90 
WASH. L. REV. 755 (2015). 
108. Id. at 792. 
109. Id. at 778. 
110. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586–87 (1994). 
111. Reese, supra note 107, at 811. 
112. Id. at 773. 
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Professor Rebecca Tushnet approaches the question of Campbell’s 
impact on fair use through the question of what is deemed necessary to 
transform, the content of the work or the purpose it serves.113 She 
explains that purpose-transformativeness depends on the idea that, in 
some instances, the defendant’s purpose is “opposed or orthogonal to the 
original authors’ aims”114 whereas in some other cases, subsequent 
authors are using prior-existing works for their own “specifically 
authorial claims” that mark these defendants as creators in their own 
right.115 Tushnet describes the success story of transformative purpose in 
terms of courts’ willingness to use it to find for defendants, but she also 
points to a few exceptions that suggest that the triumphalist account is 
not quite warranted.116 She reviews some of the arguments levied by 
critics of transformative use, and explores the way the critiques may 
misalign depending on whether a use is content- or purpose-
transformative.117 Finally, she sounds a dystopian note: if fair use 
contracts in scope, many creative and expressive interests will be 
compromised, purely in the interest of owner control.118 She concludes 
along the same lines as Jessica Litman: that the expansion of copyright 
protection reasonably calls for the expansion of fair use, too, and 
transformative use ably serves that purpose.119 
Campbell is a remarkable case, that rare opinion that, over two 
decades after its decision, scholars and practitioners continue to interpret 
and evaluate. Continue, in short, to care so much about that they are 
willing to drop everything and fly across the country for two days to 
discuss it. Whether one adopts the view that Campbell remains a cause 
for celebration,120 or a reason to bemoan the ever-eroding rights of 
copyright plaintiffs,121 few deny that Campbell remains very influential. 
That defendants almost always win when courts find a use 
transformative, citing Campbell, speaks to its continued significance.122 
Reflecting on Campbell seemed apt, in discussing a year ago the 
113. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 869, 872. 
114. Id. at 882. 
115. Id. (emphasis in original). 
116. Id. at 872–74. 
117. Id. at 887. 
118. Id. at 899.  
119. Id. at 892. 
120. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 14, at 816; Tushnet, supra note 12, at 871–72. 
121. See Litman, supra note 42, at 651 n.3, 653 n.13 (citing sources); Samuelson, supra note 14, 
at 840 n.164 (citing sources).   
122. Netanel, supra note 21, at 754. 
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possibility of this conference, as a number of high-profile cases were in 
the pipeline for resolution in 2014 and 2015. Many have since been 
decided, and a great many of them did rely on Campbell’s reasoning to 
find in favor of defendants’ fair use.123 If this Symposium and this issue 
of the Washington Law Review serve as an opportunity to assess the 
quality and extent of the evolution of transformative use, I hope they 
will also offer a snapshot of the views of some of our most prominent 
minds in copyright law, as they assess the state of the field today. Their 
observations may help us all look forward and begin to predict what 
subsequent courts may do as they continue to rely on fair use to respond 
to technological and cultural changes that stir up trouble for copyright 
law. 
 
123.  Samuelson, supra note 14, at 836. (“Campbell has understandably had considerable salience 
in transformative use cases. Yet courts have sometimes relied heavily upon it in non-transformative 
work cases.”). 
 
                                                     
